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Personal note: I am not a lawyer but a legal academic (socio-legal studies). My doctoral 
thesis was entitled ‘Resources for Mediating the Incommensurability of Science and Law in 
Legal Contexts’ (University of Westminster, March 2007). I have a background in academic 
services to medicine and am interested in the representation of science to law. Because of my 
research, I have long considered that the Judicial Studies Board should train judges in the 
philosophy and sociology of science, which would be my solution to the difficulty of 
assessing the reliability of medical and scientific expert opinion evidence in court in both civil 







There is no systematic deterioration in the ability of law to make sound judgments in 
criminal cases where scientific opinion evidence has important bearing on matters, 
even if doubt on its integrity has been cast over recent egregious errors. There are 
limitations on the capacity of science to depict the absolute truth and its conclusions 
always must be regarded as provisional. Law is not always aware of this. Science is 
not a privileged source of knowledge. It is socially constructed. Empirical studies 
attest high precision and objectivity in their findings but the design of studies affects 
the reliability of conclusions. Gatekeeper functions and rules of evidence would 
diminish pragmatism, flexibility and judicial discretion in court, notwithstanding that 
it would protect the jury from misleading evidence in some cases. If the proposal is a 
reaction to recent mishaps over convictions, it might be superfluous because law has 
not become incompetent and can continue to resolve matters using legal reasoning 
and the experience of judges. For judges to have to learn science would be arduous. 
Also, it would be unbeneficial because more would be gained by appreciation of the 
philosophy and sociology of science and the sociology of knowledge. Reference 
manuals in science are well constructed but substantial. Though training for judges in 
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the USA has been well-received, I contend that this is inappropriate. I argue for 
retention of part of Option 3 of the proposal that retains experts who can form a 
consensus over scientific evidence and present the judge with an opinion on its 
accuracy. The judge can then consider this in deciding its admissibility. This 
eliminates the ‘deference test’ and makes the ‘panel’ merely advisory. Much of the 
risk of repeating recent errors can be reduced by adopting better procedures. Expert 
opinion witnesses should be reminded of their duty to the court. A proposal has been 
located in the literature that would change the rôle of expert witnesses to ‘auxiliary 
forensic professionals’ who would not be immune from civil liability. Professional 
bodies have instituted procedures to investigate some forms of non-accidental deaths 
in children. Multiplication of such protocols will relieve law of some of the burden of 
decision-making in this and other ‘grey areas’.  
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Three words we should like to hear: ‘I don’t know.’ 1 
‘Experts should be on tap not on top.’ 2, 3 
There is certainty of knowledge but not certainty itself. 4 
 
Preamble 
Recent decisions in the English jurisdiction that have been overturned at appeal due to 
misleading expert opinion evidence at first instance have attracted public interest and 
risked bringing law into disrepute. These were egregious errors caused by flawed 
forensic evidence, unreliable witnesses or scientific uncertainty in which courts have 
erred on the wrong side. However, there is no systematic deterioration in the 
ability of law to make sound judgments where scientific opinion evidence has 
important bearing on matters in a case. Judges are not unfailingly incapable of 
deciding the weight to give evidence or of determining the evidence to prefer when 
there is conflicting expert witness opinion. Due to judicial application of legal 
reasoning rather than their attempting to become arbiters of scientific truth, the record 
of judges on decision-making is not nearly as dire as supposed.  
 
Courts expect certainty from science but, whereas law must conclude at an instant of 
time, scientific knowledge is cumulative and never concludes. Therefore, scientific 
opinion always is provisional. It can be uncertain in areas where there has not been 
sufficient study or is difficult, and this applied to the unfamiliar kinds of situations 
recently brought before the courts. The problem for law is not knowing that evidence 
is uncertain; otherwise, acquittals would proceed from ordinary legal reasoning. A 
false or wrongful acquittal of several guilty defendants is preferable to false or 
wrongful conviction of just one who is innocent.5 It can only be presumed that the 
uncharted waters of some recent cases disorientated the courts so much that they drew 
the wrong conclusions. 
 
Science never is absolute and often is socially constructed. Also, the scientific method 
is geared to reduction of sources of error and bias to the smallest possible degree, 
often using statistics to quantify ‘certainty’ and the magnitude of possible error. This 
engenders confidence in results but is always only the best estimate obtainable, which 
is why distinction is drawn in the philosophy of science between certainty of 
knowledge and certainty itself as an absolute that exists independently of our ability to 
                                                 
1




 Attributed, famously, to Sir Winston Churchill, see Analysis, 176 Canadian Medical Association (2) 
167 – 168, 16 January 2007, cited in Fisher, E (2000) ‘Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk 
Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Administration’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(1) 109 – 130 at 117, n 66 but more likely to have originated in Roberts, J (1929) ‘The Professional 
Expert and Administrative Control’, 7 Public Administration, 247 - 259 
3
 The opinion in the Select Committee on Science and Technology Report: Scientific Advice, Risk and 
Evidence Based Policy Making, No. 63, Session 2005 – 06 (8th November 2006) that ‘[T]the 
misconception that scientists in the civil service should be ‘on tap, not on top’ must be laid to rest once 
for all’ is quite wrong. It is precisely this idea that is the source of problems in hearing evidence in 
court. 
4
 Attr. Popper, K (1935/2002) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Routledge Classics. Popper’s 
contention is that the conclusions of science are by inference from the outcomes of investigation. 
5
 Attributed to Blackstone, W. (1769) Commentaries on the Laws of England, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
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know it. This is the reason that science evolves continuously in a quest for greater 
certainty. 
 
Modern scientific method represents the apotheosis in application of discipline and 
attests high accuracy in its findings. However, such accuracy is immaterial if the 
wrong design for the study has been chosen. One is reminded of the comments of Sir 
Ian Kennedy, Chairman of the former Healthcare Commission, on epidemiological 
studies concerning medicines. He compared random controlled trials (RCTs) with 
observational studies, saying that RCTs do not detect safety problems while 
observational studies are historical and describe what actually happens.6
, 7  
 
That it should be thought necessary to introduce gatekeeper functions to assess 
whether expert opinion evidence can be admitted into court is a natural reaction to 
previous problems but is a pity, because judges usually have sufficient discretion in 
normal situations to be able to direct juries appropriately. It is felt intuitively that 
imposition of a rule would detract from the flexibility and pragmatism shown in court, 
and exercise of judicial discretion, all of which frequently are effective in eliciting the 
truth. Reasonable confidence is needed that a gatekeeper for evidence would avert the 
kinds of problems previously experienced and others in future. Of course, this cannot 
be guaranteed but it would be a bad day for law if errors were to continue regardless. 
Pilot schemes or simulations would demonstrate the ability of judges to discern 
admissible evidence using the new rule, so that the effect on judgment can be seen 
without committing the criminal legal system to the new measure. 
 
Thought might also be given to differences in US and English jurisdictions on the 
handling of expert evidence. Although the USA is a common law country, it places 
great reliance on codes to standardize specific behaviour. This is evident in regulation 
of industry and the environment, a subject that I teach. There seem to be attempts at 
systematisation in the functioning of law in the USA to a degree not contemplated 
hitherto in England and Wales. This would explain the rules of evidence that your 
report examines and the requirement for a reference manual on scientific evidence. 
English courts have always proceeded on a more practical basis. In civil cases, where 
there is no jury, the judge admits all relevant evidence and decides on the weight to 
accord it, the danger in criminal hearings being that this procedure in front of a jury 
can cause confusion. All will depend in future on whether reasonable balance can be 
achieved by control of experts and their evidence. This might or might not need to 
depend on a system of rules and codes. 
 
The Law Commission’s proposal does not always make clear that legal perception 
relies on expert witness opinion evidence and it is in this is that contention and 
difficulty for law can arise. Expert witness opinion of fact often is not in dispute, can 
be simply stated and corroborated. The proposal for a new rule for admissibility of 
                                                 
6
 BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ Programme 17th October 2008  
7
 The design of epidemiological studies, sources of error and bias is explained comprehensively by 
Green, Freedman and Gordis (2000) as a Reference Guide to Epidemiology in a chapter of the 
Reference Manual of Scientific Evidence of the US Federal Judicial Centre and can be seen at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman06.pdf/$file/sciman06.pdf accessed 27.06.2009. 
Trishia Greenhalgh explains how to evaluate articles in evidence-based medicine in How to Read a 
Paper: The Basics of Evidence-Based Medicine (3rd ed), Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
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evidence concerns expert witness opinion evidence and this should be more clearly 
stated throughout.8 
 
Notwithstanding the above remarks, it is realised that there is a will to introduce this 
procedure and the response given here will be to the proposals on which comment is 
invited. 
 
Comments on Proposal 
Part 1 Introduction 
 
1.18 In Cannings: the scientific method was not at fault but investigations were not 
taken far enough (see also 2.20 and 2.21). Only subsequent study revealed the genetic 
links in the Cannings family to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, so the fault can be 
attributed to lack of thoroughness on the part of scientists. 1.19 confirms and warns 
against over-reliance on such evidence  
 
Part 2 The Problems 
 
2.7 No augmentation of or argument with the expert witness’s evidence was 
presented. This is a problem in very narrow specializations. In these circumstances, 
the evidence should be regarded with extreme caution and the judge should direct the 
jury towards acquittal. 
 
2.16 In Clark (Sally) the medical expert opinion witness made his own decision on the 
evidence to provide to the court (evidence of a staphylococcal infection in a child at 
post-mortem not disclosed at first instance). In this, the witness usurped the rôle of 
law and clearer definition of the duty of expert witnesses should be given. The witness 
in this case was responsible for wrongful conviction. 
 
2.17 – 2.19 This was an arrogant witness but courts often are impressed by senior 
figures in medicine.9 Clearly his evidence was misleading and outside his area of 
expertise. Perhaps rules of admissibility would assist here but the court should have 
taken steps to verify the statistical evidence. 
 
2.20 In Cannings, medical expert ‘dogma’, if that is what it was shown to be, could 
not have been based on empirical evidence. A rule of admissibility would expose this 
but so would challenge by the defence. 
 
2.21 n25 In view of my earlier comments, dismissing the case would be the right 
decision. Another choice might be to hold a private debate in the absence of the jury 
in an attempt to establish reasons for disagreement between experts. 
 
                                                 
8
 It is recognized that, ultimately, all issues concern fact and even opinion serves to establish it. 
However, the distinction of expert opinion evidence from purely fact as matters of record is preserved 
in the present discussion. 
9
 This idea is examined in Woolfe, LJ (2001) ‘Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical 
Profession?’ 9 Medical Law Review, 1 - 36 
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2.28 n37 No doubt Professor Redmayne is right. It is only a question of how the 
evidence is screened. 
 
2.33 Better to falsely or wrongfully acquit several guilty defendants than to falsely or 
wrongfully convict just one who is innocent. 
 
Part 3 The Common Law and Calls for Reform 
 
3.14 The consultation might be an over-reaction to previous egregious errors caused 
by poor scientific evidence and over-opinionated witnesses. Laissez-faire is not 
necessarily a bad method provided the court is not misled, because often it is better to 
hear all the evidence available, provided the judge can distinguish the reliable from 
the unreliable and so direct the jury. It has stood the English courts in good stead in 
the past. 
 
Part 4 Proposals for Reform 
 
4.3(3) Option (3) the ‘deference test’ should not be rejected without further 
consideration. The method is evocative of the civil Bolam Test,10 a rule of 
evidence in torts for professional negligence, used most often and quite 
instructively in medical actions. Consensus among experts in the field is a 
dimension missing from cases that have been misdirected. It would mediate or 
reconcile conflicting expert opinion, albeit that defence and prosecution would 
have different aims in proffering their evidence. So far as the truth can be 
ascertained, this method would more nearly approach it. However, in view of the 
preference expressed by the Law Commission consultation for Option 4, let it be 
said here that expert opinion in Option 3 should be utilized for the express 
purpose of establishing whether the evidence is accurate, significant and 
properly obtained. The judge would retain the prerogative of deciding whether it 
is admissible, not the experts. An ‘expert panel’ simply would assist the judge to 
decide. However, insofar as the experts would have agreed on a consensus, (in 
the absence of the jury), presentation of the discussed evidence, if admitted in 
proceedings, would be simplified, so that the jury would have less difficulty in 
comprehending it or its value. The judge would direct on its bearing on matters 
and the weight to accord it. The suggested rôle for such a scientific panel would 
remove the ‘deference’ from a deference test and it might instead become a 
‘reliability test’. As will be asserted later, the task of deciding admissibility of 
evidence under Option 4 without assistance would be onerous for judges, in spite 
of the help afforded by the criteria of the rule. Option 3 avoids burdening judges 
with quite exhaustive tests of reliability. Also, it would obviate the need for 
court-appointed experts. As presently framed, Option 4 still would demand of 
judges a deep understanding of scientific principles that I believe is unrealistic. 
In Option 3, such understanding would be desirable but not essential.11 
 
                                                 
10
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1WLR 582; 2All ER 118 
11
 The suggested procedure now resembles a substituted Bolam Test and discussion might ensue on 
whether these experts should be called by the parties or appointed by the court. In any event, a new rule 
of this kind would establish opinions on complex or contested evidence and a desire for consensus that 
would relieve the judge of much difficulty in deciding admissibility. 
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4.3(3) (contd.) Advice on revising Rule 702 of the US Federal Court argued for 
retention of peer review as a criterion of acceptability.12 The same author considered 
this would retain for the scientific community the ability to judge the reliability of 
scientific evidence. The present consultee upholds the first part of this opinion but not 
the second. In practice, a panel of scientists reaching consensus over opinion 
expressed by the parties would do no more than submit its opinion to the judge, who 
would consider it among other aspects of a case in reaching a conclusion (see above 
paragraph). The power of science must be limited to providing help to law and not 
using scientific persuasion to propel a legal pronouncement. 
 
4.45 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert Test still cannot tell 
if the evidence is unreliable in areas of great uncertainty or divided opinion. It does 
not represent a magic bullet. This is precisely where problems for law arise. I continue 
to doubt whether judges can or should take on this rôle unaided. 
 
4.47 Theories cannot necessarily have an empirical basis. For instance, the force 
necessary to produce the symptoms of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ are not known.13 
Scientific studies do not always present ‘tidy’ outcomes with neat data and clear 
conclusions. The criteria of Frye and Daubert tests, Rule 702 nor the test proposed as 
Option 4 might be able to be universally applied.  
 
4.47(4) Rejection of minority views is justifiable in terms of the criteria specified for 
admissibility tests in the consultation paper. However, in civil cases using the Bolam 
Test of medical opinion, where there is conflicting expert evidence, a minority view 
sometimes can be accepted. Although dealing with questions of acceptable medical 
practice in establishing the standard of care, comparison with criminal cases can be 
made, at least academically. In Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors 14 Lord 
Bridge said, ‘Where the medical evidence is equivocal or where, for example, there is 
a conflict of evidence whether a responsible body of medical opinion supports a 
particular practice, the judge has to resolve that conflict.’ In Fincham v Anchor 
Insulation Co Ltd.,15 it was stated that the judge has a duty to make a legal diagnosis 
where the medical experts were unable to agree on whether the plaintiff was suffering 
from asbestosis. At appeal in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority 16 it was 
determined that was not sufficient for a defendant to produce evidence from a number 
of experts that his opinion accorded with medical practice in order to escape liability. 
The court had to be satisfied that the exponents of medical opinion relied upon could 
demonstrate that such opinion had a logical basis.17
, 18 These interpretations are 
                                                 
12
 Tamerelli, AW (1994) ‘Daubert V Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Questionable Wisdom of 
Abandoning The Peer Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony’, 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 
1175 – 1203  
13
 One is reminded of a demonstration by the prosecution of the force necessary to shake a baby to 
death using a doll, in the televised trial of Louise Woodward, Massachusetts v. Woodward (SJC-07635 
Commonwealth vs. Louise Woodward (and a companion case). Middlesex. March 9, 1998. - June 16, 
1998, which I would advise was nothing less than a spectacle. 
14
 [1985] 1 All ER 643, 643 per Bridge LJ; 
15
 The Times, June 16 1989 QBD 
16
 [1988] AC (HL) (E) at 243 
17
 Harpwood, V (2001) ‘Bolitho, Expert Logic and the Rôle of Judges’, 6 Health Law (10) 1 – 3 
18
 See also discussion in Jones MA (1996) Medical Negligence, London: Sweet & Maxwell §3 - 126 – 
3 - 128; 
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sensible and make two important points. The first is that, by implication from legal 
opinion, a minority view is acceptable if it has a logical basis. From the ruling in 
Bolam, the second is that the standard of medical practice was entirely a matter of 
expert opinion was weakened by Bolitho, returning it to legal judgment.19 In a 
gatekeeper system, these tensions could be resolved with the jury absent but it should 
not be a foregone conclusion that the scientific opinion with less representation is 
necessarily the wrong one. The real danger is where there is only one opinion on 
which to rely but it would have behoven the courts at least to have satisfied 
themselves in some recent instances that the opinion proffered had a logical basis. 
 
4.52, 4.57 – 4.58 I am not sure that all scientists subscribe wholeheartedly to Popper’s 
notion of falsification, in spite of Professor Dawkins’ assurances, and rely much more 
on the principle of verification. Explanations in the sociology of science would 
account for this. Empirical studies are set up to test the truth of an envisaged 
hypothesis. This is the theory and assumption laden inquiry driving the research. A 
null hypothesis is created as putative falsification of the test hypothesis and protects 
the integrity of the method. In real life though, effort is focussed into proving the test 
hypothesis true. A statistical value is allotted to the possibility that the null hypothesis 
will be found true by chance.20 A truly falsificationalist approach would set out to 
prove the null hypothesis true, or at least to find the test hypothesis false. Falsification 
strategies are driven by the need for absolute consistency among repeated studies, 
involving iterative, regressive tests of theory. Influences on inconsistent results are 
removed or corrected each time, until the outcome is unfailingly reliable. While an 
estimable concept, it is hardly practicable and few can afford to subscribe to it in 
reality. The reputation of scientists would not be enhanced by showing, however 
altruistically, that their conclusions could be discredited. This is not to disparage 
scientific evidence, because this is usually honestly produced and can be validated 
according to the rigour with which it was sought, albeit that this inherently is not 
without limitation. 
 
4.69 That witnesses must explain why their evidence is reliable represents an advance 
on the problem of determining admissibility. It unburdens the judge from making 
his/her own assessment ‘cold’ and can be done in the absence of the jury. Also, it 
would remind expert opinion witnesses of their responsibility to the court. 
 
4.80 – 4.85 Judges need not gain scientific expertise in order to assess the reliability 
of evidence but should develop their own evaluation tools based on how scientists 
believe what they do, which is a matter of the philosophy of science, and how science 
is conducted, which is explained by the sociology of science and the sociology of 
knowledge. This can be learned more simply than trying to absorb the multifactorial 
matters of science. An appreciation of science as a discipline would stand judges in 
better stead than trying to assess scientific information per se.  
 
Part 6 Proposals for Consultation 
 
                                                 
19
 Gilson, CC (2006) ‘Resources for Mediating the Incommensurability of Science and Law in Legal 
Contexts’, PhD Thesis, London: University of Westminster 140 - 146 
20
 Referred to as the ‘p’ value and is typically very small. 
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6.4 If admissibility tests are introduced, will allowance not be made in future for 
witness demeanour? Literature describes this phenomenon in terms of civil cases but 
there is no reason it should not apply equally to criminal hearings. This is described as 
the personality of the witness, the impression they make upon the trial judge, for 
example, whether they confined themselves to giving evidence or acted as 
advocates.21 There are also issues of whether witnesses make concessions to the other 
side.22 To these I would add the ability of witnesses to justify and defend their own 
evidence objectively under pressure from cross-examination 23 and willingness to 
modify their opinions in the light of argument from the other side. Performances of 
witnesses under such admittedly stressful situations informs judges usefully about 
their conviction in the evidence they proffer and often helps judges decide on the 
evidence to prefer where it conflicts. This is a most valuable court dynamic. 
Whereas it might possibly confuse juries, were this process to be held behind closed 
doors, they would miss an important element in assessing evidence for themselves. 
This militates against introduction of rules of admissibility.  
 
6.10 – 6.33 (overall) Examination of evidence against the suggested criteria would be 
very demanding of the skills and knowledge of the judge. Naturally, I consider it 
would be good if it could be done. Training in scientific methodology undoubtedly 
would help but I consider the task would be enormous and the time required 
considerable. Inevitably, the judge still would require assistance at times. As 
commented previously, evidence will not necessarily come in the neat packages 
anticipated by the authors of the report and it might be a naïve hope that the judge 
always can apply the criteria without difficulty. It could mean that evidence not 
meeting the criteria would be excluded for that reason but unusual forms of study, 
while not qualifying under the protocol, nonetheless might be valuable to the case. 
 
6.23 (particularly). The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence of the US Federal 
Judicial Center (2000, 2
nd
 edition)24 is an impressive and weighty exposition of 
science in areas that might impinge on legal judgments. My initial concern on 
inspecting it was that absorbing its contents would be burdensome for judges. While 
its contents are authoritatively written, it struck me as more informative for scientists 
in relation to evidence, most of whom already have sufficient background knowledge 
to accommodate it.25
, 26 However, judges in the USA expressed their appreciation of 
the ‘Manual’, this opinion being gathered in an evaluation of it in preparation for a 
third edition.27 Of special note for the purpose of this consultation is the section on 
                                                 
21
 Caldeira v Gray [1936] 1All ER 540, 542 The Privy Council 
22
 Joyce v Yeomans [19891] 1WLR549, 556, cited with approval in Maynard v West Midlands Regional 
Health Authority [1984] 1WLR634, 637 
23
 Loveday v Renton [1990] 1 MLR 117 PER Stuart Smith at 125 
24
 at http://air.fjc.gov/public/fjcweb.nsf/pages/16 (index of contents) accessed 27.06.2009 
25
 Commentary suggests that expert scientific witnesses regard it as helpful in preparation of their 
evidence (see next footnote) 
26
 It is also worth commenting that the contents of the Reference Manual are formed on the same 
assumptions that underlie the operations of science 
27
 (2009) Evaluation of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Letter Report, Committee on the 
Evaluation of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Committee on Science, Technology and 
Law, Policy and Global Affairs, National Research Council of the National Academies, the National 
Academies Press, Washington, DC at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12581.html accessed 27.06.2009    
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‘How Science Works’ by David Goodstein,28 which is almost a sociology of science 
that also explodes several myths about how science is conducted. For the present 
consultee, this confirms a personal belief that it is neither useful nor practicable to 
teach judges the amount of science they would need in order to gauge the 
admissibility of scientific evidence for use in court (while admitting they only would 
‘dip’ into it for information of a specific type). Of more substantial and enduring 
benefit would be training in the philosophy of science that explains how scientists 
believe and the assumptions underlying their work, and the sociology of science that 
explains the conditions under which science is done. These are abstract and theoretical 
concepts that therefore are generalizable to all areas where science is recruited to 
assist law. David Goodstein’s section goes partway to achieving this. 
 
6.23 (contd.) Regarding judge training, I am interested in the possibilities this 
presages and would have prepared an article on the subject, had events (The Law 
Commission Consultation!) not overtaken me. I believe it would be possible along the 
lines mentioned in the above paragraph. However, I have sampled the judge training 
seminars ‘Science for Judges’ offered by the Brooklyn Law School, Series I – XI 
(March 2003 – April 2007).29, 30, 31 Papers accompanying the seminars have been 
published extensively in the School’s own Journal of Law and Policy.32 Reactions to 
the seminars by judges generally were good.33 From videos of the programmes 
available on line, it appears the studies were sought by judges and were popular. 
Other resources exist, for example the Knowledge and Information Services (Science) 
of the US National Centre for State Courts.34
, 35 One is left only to wonder if similar 
seminars to those held in the United States would succeed among judges in the 
English jurisdiction, or whether anything is different in the training of judges from 
that in the USA that might require a different approach.  
 
6.29 It is important that judges should not be distracted from their judicial rôle.  
 
6.39 It can be difficult, sometimes, to detect unwarranted assumptions amid complex 
scientific evidence or where the expert is particularly impressive. 
 
6.40 Courts should avoid capture by science. Even if scientific evidence is ruled 
admissible, the court should always decide the weight to give it in reaching a 
                                                 
28
 p.67 at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf accessed 
27.06.2009 
29
 Held under the auspices of the Center for Health, Science and Public Policy of Brooklyn Law School 
in collaboration with the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts and the 
Committee on Science, Technology and Law of the National Academies of Science 
30
 http://www.brooklaw.edu/centers/scienceforjudges/ accessed 27.06.2009 
31
 It is understood this series of seminars has been discontinued because they were funded by a grant 
that has now expired. 
32
 Available on line at http://www.brooklaw.edu/centers/scienceforjudges/papers.php  
33
 See Evaluation of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, (op. cit. 2009) pp11 – 12 
34
 at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/courtopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=SciTec&guide=148 accessed 
27.06.2009 
35
 Literature is being generated in recognition of the problem of statistical evidence for judges. For 
instance I can recommend Aitken, CGG and Tarovi, F (2008) ‘Fundamentals of Statistical 
Evidence—a Primer for Legal Professionals’, 12 International Journal of Evidence and Proof (3) 181 – 
207; Barnes, DW (1983) Statistics as Proof. Fundamentals of Quantitative Evidence, Boston and 
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company 
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conclusion. If the attitude is struck that science is not a privileged source of 
knowledge, 36 courts might accord its proper place among all the evidence relating to 
the case. This should happen even when the evidence is pivotal. Courts are courts of 
law, not courts of science. 
 
6.53 (3) Science is not so open and democratic as supposed (see my comments under 
4.52, 4.57 – 4.58 supra). 
 
6.56 The caveats of 6.55 are accepted and, in the example given, the dispute over the 
meaning of symptoms of cranial injury now has been resolved by research. At the 
time of the original trials, though, there was disagreement. Of course, the defence may 
not raise spurious issues to contradict prosecution evidence but scientific uncertainty 
will continue to occur in yet unknown future instances. The instruction of 6.56 is wise 
but it might not be able to be applied unfailingly if there is no clear blue sky between 
competing theories. How would a rule of evidence be applied if two (or more) 
competing theories were to pass the test of reliability, or it was impossible to tell 
whether one was ‘more reliable’ than another? 
 
6.65 – 6.71 (Court-appointed assessors). This idea is logical but far from new. 
Judges always have been at liberty to call such an expert. In the USA, courts have 
authority to appoint an expert under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or at 
their own discretion. There is evidence from the USA that court appointed experts are 
employed, but infrequently, to give opinions where expert testimony conflicts.37 There 
is neither an overwhelming opinion in favour of the employment of court-appointed 
assessors nor one against the practice. The method of appointment appears haphazard. 
The results of a survey showed difficulty in accommodating court-appointed experts 
in a court system that values adversarial presentation of evidence and where it was 
stated that only rarely did the adversarial system fail to permit informed assessment of 
facts.38 Other difficulties were identified, some of which might not occur in the 
procedures described in the Law Commission discussion paper, for instance problems 
in obtaining a suitable expert.39 The above study describes a pretrial procedure to aid 
in understanding complex expert testimony,40 including early identification of 
disputed expert testimony,41 attempts to narrow disputes and screening of expected 
testimony by parties’ experts to ensure admissibility.42 
 
6.73 (Judicial training) Yes. I refer here to my comments under §6.23 
 
6.78 (Statutory test of admissibility) on balance, yes, but I remain concerned about 
loss of judicial discretion and flexibility in proceedings.  
 
6.79 (Guidelines for judges) yes but along the lines I have proposed under §6.73 
                                                 
36
 Emphasis added 
37
 Cecil, JS and Willging, TE (1994) ‘Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Rôle for court-




 See Law Commission Consultation Paper §6.67, fn 70 
40
 Cecil, JS and Willging, TE (1994) op. cit.1059 
41
 ibid,  
42
 ibid, 1062 
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6.80 (experienced-based evidence) Yes, if subjected to cross-examination 
 
6.81 (Parties should demonstrate reliability of evidence) Yes, subject to the caveats I 
have raised 
 
6.82 Common law provision over evidence has served well and only relatively few 
trials have been misled by questionable evidence. It might be a step too far to enshrine 
the envisaged procedures in primary legislation. I am not certain how §§1.2(1) and (3) 
could be codified. It could be advisable to codify §1.3 in primary legislation but see 
my comments under ‘General comments not solicited by the consultation, 
Responsibilities of expert opinion witnesses to the court’ infra. 
 
6.83(1) (independent assessor) Yes. 
 
6.83(2) (establishing evidentiary reliability before the jury is sworn) If the procedure 
is adopted, then yes. 
 
6.84 – 6.88 (Impact Assessment) I am not fully qualified to comment on all the issues 
raised in this part of the consultation. The economic benefit of fewer wrongful 
convictions by institution of evidentiary reliability tests is hard to estimate; the 
psychological and social benefits of fewer errors in legal decisions would be easier to 
appreciate. Respect for the law would be enhanced. However, the foregoing presumes 
that errors will continue and multiply. This is not necessarily so, even if scientific 
complexity will continue to cause problems for law. Lessons already have been 
learned from previous mistakes. Forensic services and standards have been improved. 
Expert opinion witnesses can be reminded of their responsibilities to the court. My 
responses to the consultation have shown that more might be lost than gained by new 
statutory provisions concerning admissibility of evidence but I have contended that 
means exist to improve the understanding of science by the judiciary without them 
needing to become experts in science themselves. 
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Appendix: General comments not solicited by the consultation 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF EXPERT OPINION WITNESSES TO THE COURT 
This issue suggests itself throughout the reading of problems to which the 
consultation eludes. In combination with gatekeeping functions and the need for 
parties to attest the reliability of their evidence (the court determines whether it is 
correct), there is a need to remind witnesses of their duty to the court.43 This might 
deter the adventuresome behaviour that has characterized some recent expert 
testimony. No doubt expert opinion witnesses, especially repeat players, who lead 
courts into unsafe convictions can be subjected to sanctions but they cannot be made 
liable for their evidence. Duties of experts in civil hearings are set out in Civil 
Procedure Rule Part 35, following advice in the judgment of the Ikarian Reefer.44 
Since 2006, the duties of experts in criminal litigation have been governed by 
Criminal Procedure Rule Part 33 (Criminal Procedure Rules 2005).45 The Disclosure 
Manual of Crown Prosecution Service imposes quality controls on the use of 
experts.46 Some of the most controversial cases either took place before 
commencement of these measures but the record reveals little indication that the 
responsibilities of experts to the courts were stressed. In this regard, the literature 
reveals examination of whether there should be a liability on the parties for their 
evidence and the rôle of remedies in preventing unsupported testimony.47 The author 
says,  
 
‘Experts would be better treated as auxiliary forensic professionals, albeit 
whose primary allegiance is to scientific rigour in the pursuit of justice rather 
than serving as advocate for their client. As such, experts should be open to 
civil action in a similar way to legal professionals.’ 48 
 
This radically would change the relationship of experts to the court and require 
significant revision of procedure. However, it might safeguard the court from 
speculative expert opinion and lessen the expectation on judges that they should 
become conversant with science. Against the notion would be the deterrent effect 
likely on experts to becoming witnesses for fear of legal action. Some sentiments of 
this kind already have been expressed in relation to prominent expert opinion 
witnesses who have been heavily criticised by law.49 
SUDDEN INFANT DEATH SYNDROME (SIDS) 
This is included here because it demonstrates proceduralization of investigation into 
sudden unexpected death of infants. It formalizes actions and responsibilities on the 
part of the several involved agencies so that, for the purposes of law, reasonable 
                                                 
43
 As opposed to the party engaging them 
44
 National Justice Compania v Prudential Assurance [1993] 2 Lloyds Report, 68 Comm. Ct. 
45
 available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/criminal/procrules_fin/contents/rules/part_33.htm#IDAIDP4B 
accessed 30.06.2009 
46
  at http://cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/ accessed 30.06.2009 
47
 Dwyer, D (2008) ‘Legal Remedies for the Negligent Expert’, 12 The International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof (2) 93 - 115 
48
 Ibid 115 
49
 See ‘Child doctors express 'concerns'’ at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7348486.stm accessed 
30.06.2009 
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assumptions can be made about cause of death that do not rely on the opinion of a 
single expert.50 Amid these circumstances, no longer will it be necessary for courts to 
attempt their own determination of culpability if the procedure attests that a death has 
been from natural causes. In fact, there would be no case to answer. This signifies 
improvement in the standard of evidence available and foretells that courts no longer 
will have to wrestle over difficult decisions in this area. Progress of this kind in other 
areas of uncertainty would reduce the need for rules of admissibility of evidence. 
 
Bibliographical Note: the following edited book arose from the proceedings of ‘Law’s 
Experts’, a conference on expertise in Canberra in 2002. Of special interest to this 
consultation is Chapter 8, Judging facts: managing expert knowledge in legal 
decision-making and Chapter 11, The invisible branch: the authority of science 
studies in expert evidence jurisprudence. 
 











                                                 
50
 Sudden Unexpected Death in Infancy. A Multi-Agency Protocol for Care and Investigation, The 
Report of a Working Group Convened by The Royal College of Pathologists and The Royal College of 
Paediatrics and Child Health, September 2004 available at www.rcpath.org and www.rcpch.ac.uk  
